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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Dahl appeals from his judgment of conviction, challenging the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.  The district court erred in denying Mr. Dahl’s motion
because the officers who entered his family’s home at the invitation of his eight-year-old
sister would not have discovered any contraband in his bedroom but for the illegal entry,
which never ceased.  The State did not meet its burden of establishing that any consent
given for the search of Mr. Dahl’s bedroom was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
entry to expunge the taint of the unlawful police conduct; nor did the State meet its
burden of establishing the validity of that consent.
Mr.  Dahl  submits  this  Reply  Brief  to  further  argue  that  he  met  his  burden  of
showing the evidence found in his bedroom would not have come to light but for the
government’s unconstitutional conduct, and the State failed to meet its burden of
showing any consent given for the search of Mr. Dahl’s bedroom was sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal entry.  Mr. Dahl also responds to the State’s argument that
the issue of the validity of the consent was not preserved for this Court’s review.  The
record reflects the issue was raised in the district court, was decided by the district
court, and can be considered by this Court on appeal.  Because the evidence found in
Mr. Dahl’s bedroom was the product of illegal government activity, it should have been
suppressed.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Dahl included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his opening
brief.  (App. Br., pp.1-6.)  He incorporates that statement by reference herein.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Dahl’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Dahl’s Motion To Suppress
A. Mr. Dahl’s Room Would Not Have Been Searched But For The Officers’ Illegal
Entry Into His Home
Under State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 2014), the defendant must make
a prima facie showing that the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come
to light but for the government’s unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 127.  The defendant
must show that, on the events that took place, “the discovery of the evidence was a
product or result of the unlawful police conduct.” Id. (citation committed).  The State
contends Mr. Dahl did not make this prima facie showing, arguing this case is
analogous to Kapelle.  (Resp. Br., pp.12-17.)  The State is mistaken.
In Kapelle, the Court of Appeals concluded that one of the officers who
approached the defendant’s trailer in response to a confidential tip about a wanted felon
conducted an illegal search when he circled around the trailer.  158 Idaho at 123, 127.
The Court concluded, however, that the incriminating evidence found in the trailer was
not the product of illegal activity because the illegal search “did not yield any
incriminating evidence” and, by the time the defendant consented to the officer’s entry
into his trailer, the officer who had conducted the illegal search “had returned to the front
of the trailer.” Id. at 128.  The Court explained “the illegal search had ended and the
officer was again in a place he was lawfully entitled to be.” Id.
In the present case, the officers’ illegal entry into Mr. Dahl’s home never ended.
The officers were not in a place they were lawfully entitled to be when they arguably
obtained consent from Mr. Dahl’s mother, and ultimately Mr. Dahl, for the search of
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Mr. Dahl’s bedroom.  This would be a different case if, after illegally entering Mr. Dahl’s
home, the officers left the home, and later re-entered the home legally.  But that is not
what happened.  The officers never left Mr. Dahl’s home and there is no indication they
would have been allowed entry into the home by anyone other than Mr. Dahl’s eight-
year-old sister.
When the officers first knocked on the door of Mr. Dahl’s residence, they had to
wait almost three minutes for a response.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, at 00:08-02:48.)  After
having a conversation with Mr. Dahl’s eight-year-old sister, which ended with the front
door being closed, they knocked again, and waited almost two minutes for the girl to
respond again.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, at 03:02-04:46.)  When the officers entered the
home at the invitation of the child, they waited another minute and one-half for
Mr. Dahl’s mother to appear, and Officer Hoeksema apologized for waking her.  (Mot. to
Aug., Ex. A, at 06:08-07:26.)  When they went upstairs to Mr. Dahl’s bedroom, the
officers found Mr. Dahl in boxers and a t-shirt and Officer Hoeksema assumed Mr. Dahl
had been asleep.  (9/8/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-18.)
But for the officers’ illegal entry into Mr. Dahl’s home, which never ended, the
officers would not have encountered either Mr. Dahl or his mother and would not have
been in a position to search Mr. Dahl’s room, with or without consent.  The evidence
discovered in Mr. Dahl’s bedroom would not have come to light but for the government’s
unconstitutional conduct.
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B. The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Establishing The Consent Given By
Mr. Dahl And/Or His Mother Was Sufficiently Attenuated From The Illegal Entry
To Expunge The Taint Of The Unlawful Police Conduct
“Once a defendant demonstrates a causal connection between the police
misconduct and the evidence, the burden shifts to the government to show that the
unlawful conduct did not taint the evidence, either by demonstrating discovery through
independent means, inevitable discovery, or attenuation from the illegality sufficient to
dissipate its taint.” State v. Cohagan, 2016 WL 7048041, at *(Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2016).
“The attenuation doctrine permits the use of evidence that would normally be
suppressed as fruit of the police misconduct if the causal chain between the misconduct
and the discovery of the evidence has been sufficiently attenuated.” Id. In State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court employed a three-factor test to
determine whether unlawful governmental conduct has been adequately attenuated.
The factors to be considered are:  “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and
the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3)
the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Page, 140 Idaho at
846.
Mr. Dahl argued in his opening brief that all of these factors weighed against a
finding of attenuation, and analogized this case to State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335
(Ct. App. 2009).  (App. Br., pp.10-12.)  The State does not discuss the three factors in
its brief; nor does the State address or attempt to distinguish Hudson.  (Resp.
Br., pp.17-20.)  Instead, the State argues the officers’ illegal entry into Mr. Dahl’s home
was sufficiently attenuated from the evidence found in Mr. Dahl’s bedroom because
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“there was no exploitation of the alleged illegality.”  (Resp. Br., p.18.)  Not only is this
not the test for attenuation, the State is incorrect.
The officers’ unlawful entry in Mr. Dahl’s home was not sufficiently attenuated
from the discovery of the evidence in Mr. Dahl’s bedroom because very little time
elapsed between the illegal entry and the acquisition of the evidence; the consent that
was supposedly obtained from Mr. Dahl’s mother and Mr. Dahl was inextricably
intertwined with the illegal entry; and the officers knew they were entering Mr. Dahl’s
home illegally, and knowingly took advantage of their position inside the home to search
Mr. Dahl’s bedroom.  Notably, the State fails to mention the fact that the officers lied in
their reports about the circumstances surrounding their entry into Mr. Dahl’s home.
Both officers falsely stated in their police reports that they were invited into Mr. Dahl’s
home by an adult.  (Conf. Exs., pp.23, 26.)  The officers knew a child could not lawfully
allow them to enter the residence.  The district court concluded “it was not reasonable
for the officers to believe the child had actual authority to grant them permission to enter
the home, nor was it reasonable for them to conclude that such consent was voluntary.”
(R., p.72.)  The district court further concluded the officers “should have reasonably
known that [the eight-year-old child] did not have authority to consent to the entry.”
(R., p.72.)  The State does not challenge these conclusions on appeal.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct.” Cohagan, 2016 WL 7048041, *4 (quoting Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).  Application of the exclusionary rule here serves this
deterrent function because the officers who entered Mr. Dahl’s home with the “consent”
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of Mr. Dahl’s eight-year-old sister knowingly engaged in conduct which benefitted them
at the expense of Mr. Dahl’s rights. See id.
C. Even If The Consent Was Sufficiently Attenuated From The Illegal Entry, The
State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Establishing By A Preponderance Of The
Evidence The Validity Of That Consent
Mr. Dahl argued in his opening brief that even if the consent given by him and/or
his mother was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry, the State did not meet its
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of that consent.
(App. Br., pp.12-14.)  The State argues in its brief that this issue was not preserved for
this Court’s review because Mr. Dahl “never raised an alleged lack of voluntariness of
his and his mother’s consents as a basis for suppression below.”  (Resp. Br., p.20.)
The State’s argument is directly contradicted by the record.
At the suppression hearing, counsel for Mr. Dahl explained to the district court:
You’ll hear on the audio that it’s not clear whether Mr. Dahl gave the
officers consent when they entered his bedroom.  I only point this out if it
becomes relevant.  I don’t think it’s relevant because I think the entry into
the home was unlawful, and so all of this should be suppressed.  But I
think it’s important to know that because the search of his room could be
suppressed on the grounds that there was no consent for him to get into
the bedroom.
(Tr. p.22, Ls.8-16.)  The district court asked counsel for Mr. Dahl, “Was it clear on the
audio that Ms. Dahl granted consent to search?”  (Tr., p.23, Ls.2-3.)  Counsel
responded that even if Mr. Dahl’s mother had consented, her consent would not have
been valid because Mr. Dahl had a privacy interest in his own room.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-
23.)  The district court asked the prosecutor whether he had “[a]ny argument.”
(Tr., p.24, L.23.)  The prosecutor responded:
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I didn’t really deal with whether the homeowner had given consent or the
defendant had given consent because that wasn’t something that was
argued in the defense brief . . . .  So I sort of just stepped over that issue
without necessarily conceding it because I really didn’t think it was
relevant . . . .  So it’s very difficult to me to respond to some of the cases
cited by the defense today because I haven’t had the benefit of reading
them, and it wasn’t in their brief, so I didn’t prepare that issue.  However,
I’ll take a look at those cases after the fact and supplement my response if
I think it’s necessary, but I still think, Judge, the issue is whether there’s a
nexus.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.9-25 (paragraph breaks omitted).)  The district court responded, “Well, I
too want to take a look at those cases and incorporate the rulings in those cases to the
facts of this particular situation.”  (Tr., p.26, Ls.5-7.)
  Following the hearing, counsel for Mr. Dahl filed a notice of supplemental
authority arguing “[t]he State has failed to meet its burden [of proving] that valid consent
was given to search the Dahl residence.”  (R., pp.56-57.)  The State filed an objection to
Mr. Dahl’s supplemental authority arguing “[t]he defense has clearly changed its basis
for requested suppression.”  (R., pp.62-63.)  The State asked the district court “not [to]
consider” the supplemental authority cited by Mr. Dahl.  (R., p.63.)  The district court
impliedly overruled the State’s objection, as it cited to and discussed Mr. Dahl’s
supplemental authority in its memorandum decision denying Mr. Dahl’s motion to
suppress.  (R., pp.72-74.)  The district court concluded that even though the officers
entered Mr. Dahl’s home illegally, “the two other valid consents independently justified
the initial warrantless entry.”  (R., p.74.)
Because Mr. Dahl raised in the district court the issue of the validity of the
consent given by him and his mother, the issue has been preserved for this Court’s
review.  With respect to the merits of this issue, Mr. Dahl relies on the argument he
included in his opening brief.  (App. Br., pp.12-14.)
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above as well as those set forth in his opening brief,
Mr. Dahl respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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